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Performing in a social context can result in negative feelings when our actions harm
another person, but it can also lead to positive feelings when observing an opponent fail.
The extent to which individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits, often characterized as
self-centered with reduced concern for others’ welfare, are sensitive to own and others’
success and failure is yet unknown. However, knowledge about these processes is crucial
for comprehending how these traits are involved in understanding ourselves and others
during social interactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study,
healthy females scoring low or high on psychopathic traits performed a cannon-shooting
game in non-social, cooperative, and competitive contexts. We hypothesized group dif-
ferences regarding: (1) monitoring of own actions in a non-social context (errors that only
negatively affect oneself) versus cooperative context (errors that also harm others), (2)
successfully performing with either positive (shared gain) or negative consequences
(selfish gain) for the co-player, and (3) observing other’s performance leading to shared or
selfish gain for oneself. Decreased performance-monitoring-related activations were found
in posterior medial frontal cortex for females scoring high on psychopathic traits in the
social versus non-social context. When observing others, striatal activations were stronger
for selfish gains for high scorers and for shared gains for low scorers. The current outcomes
demonstrate that performance-monitoring and reward-related brain activations impor-
tantly depend on the interplay between psychopathic traits and social context. We propose
that these neural mechanisms may underlie the more self-centered behavior of individuals
scoring high on psychopathic traits. As such, the current findings may open up new
research avenues, which could advance our understanding of how personality traits
impact performance monitoring in a wide variety of social contexts and could possibly lead
to the development of interventions aimed at normalizing reduced concern for others.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Wassenaarseweg 52, 233
niv.nl (S. Overgaauw).
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When performing in a non-social context, people only have to
deal with their own failures and the associated negative out-
comes. Performing in a social context, however, is often
associated with additional cognitive and affective processes
(Cracco, Desmet, & Brass, 2016; De Bruijn, de Lange, von
Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009; De Bruijn & von Rhein, 2012;
Koban, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Vuilleumier, 2013). Errors
made in a social context can, for example, lead to enhanced
feelings of guilt and shame when your error has negative
consequences for another person (De Bruijn, Jansen, &
Overgaauw, 2019; Ruissen, Overgaauw, & De Bruijn, 2018;
Yu, Hu, Hu, & Zhou, 2014). However, it can also lead to posi-
tive feelings, such as pleasure when observing a competitor
making a mistake resulting in personal gain (Molenberghs &
Louis, 2018; Ruissen et al., 2018). People’s understanding of
the impact of one’s own actions on others as well as the
response to others’ success and failure is subject to large in-
dividual differences. However, understanding the role of in-
dividual differences in these processes is crucial for advancing
our knowledge about why some people behave in a more self-
centered manner, while others are more focused on other-
regarding behavior. This especially holds for individuals who
score high on psychopathic traits and who often show altered
sensitivity to feel with people. Cleckley (1941) describes psy-
chopaths as individuals who have high intellectual abilities
enabling them tomanipulate others and to, for example, twist
things to their own interest. Additionally, their lack of
consideration for others due to reduced levels of empathy
(Blair, 2018) makes them less responsive to distress in others
(Blair, 2013). Moreover, an important feature of psychopaths is
their failure to accept responsibility for own actions by
externalizing blame (H€akk€anen-Nyholm & Hare, 2009). Espe-
cially individuals who show high levels of callous and un-
emotional traits are characterized by empathy deficits and
lacking feelings of guilt and shame (Frick & Viding, 2009).
Recently, the so-called “self to other model of empathy” has
been proposed that directly connects psychopathic traits such
as reduced empathy and a shift towards self-centered rather
than other-directed behavior to deficits in understanding
others (Bird & Viding, 2014). The authors argue that empathy
deficits in this population are the result of diminished affec-
tive information processing (involving the anterior insula and
anterior cingulate cortex), which ise together with contextual
information e an important source of information that helps
to understand others. Affective information is a representa-
tion of your own affective state, either triggered by the self
(e.g., memories) or by the emotions of someone else (i.e.,
emotional contagion). A lacking ability to share feelings can
enhance self-centered behavior, which has been supported by
a prior study demonstrating higher levels of schadenfreude
(i.e., a pleasure derived from the misfortune of others) in in-
dividuals reporting higher levels of psychopathic traits (James,
Kavanagh, Jonason, Chonody, & Scrutton, 2014; Paulus et al.,
2018; Porter, Bhanwer, Woodworth, & Black, 2014). Although
research and descriptions on psychopathic traits initially only
concerned (violent) criminal offenders, externalizing blame
and lower feelings of guilt and shame for own actions havealso been found to be related to psychopathic traits in a sub-
clinical sample, supporting the relevance of studying indi-
vidual differences in community samples (Prado, Treeby, &
Crowe, 2016). The current study aims to investigate the role
of individual differences in psychopathic traits in healthy fe-
male adults when i) monitoring own actions when making
mistakes that only negatively affect oneself (non-social
context) versus mistakes that additionally negatively affect
others (cooperation context), ii) successfully performing with
either positive (shared gain) or negative consequences (selfish
gain) for the co-player, and iii) observing other’s performance
leading to shared or selfish gain for oneself.
Studies on performance monitoring have initially been
driven by the discovery of an event-related component using
electroencephalography (EEG) (Gehring, Gross, Coles, Meyer,&
Donchin, 1993). This so-called error-related negativity (ERN) is
an increased negative deflection occurring between 60 and
120 msec after an erroneous response (Falkenstein,
Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990; Gehring et al., 1993).
The ERN is assumed to play a role in our ability to learn from
our errors and is followed by a positive component known as
the error positivity (Pe), thought to be involved in more
conscious, evaluative aspects of error processing (O’Connell
et al., 2007; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014). Detect-
ing our errors and learning from them can be achieved
through constant monitoring of our performance, and this
process thus enables flexible behavior (De Bruijn et al., 2009;
Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010). Studies using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown that performance
monitoring heavily relies on posterior medial frontal cortex
(pMFC) and bilateral anterior insula (AI) with increased acti-
vations for error versus correct responses. pMFC activations
typically include anteriormidcingulate cortex (aMCC) and pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) (see e.g., Botvinick,
Cohen, & Carter, 2004; De Bruijn et al., 2009; Debener et al.,
2005; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004).
In contrast, activation in the striatum is more pronounced for
positive compared to negative outcomes (see e.g., De Bruijn
et al., 2009).
Initial research on performance monitoring focused on
individual, i.e., non-social contexts. However, humans are
social creatures, meaning that our actions often have conse-
quences for the people around us and that we need to adapt
our behavior in response to others’ actions. As a result, re-
searchers have more recently started to focus on social per-
formance monitoring. De Bruijn et al. (2009), for example,
investigated the role of the social context in performance
monitoring by letting healthy volunteers perform the so-
called Cannonball task in which they had to play with (coop-
erative context) or against (competitive context) an unknown
peer. fMRI results showed that pMFC was similarly activated
for own and observed errors, irrespective of whether the co-
actor was a cooperative partner or an opponent (for a similar
finding using EEG see De Bruijn & von Rhein, 2012). The
striatum, however, showed distinctive activation depending
on the financial outcome; increased activity was found for
own and observed correct actions as well as for incorrect ac-
tions from an opponent, highlighting its role in reward-related
processing. Thus, striatumwas activated for shared gains, but
also for gains at the expense of another person, so-called
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making harmful mistakes (i.e., mistakes that cause pain in
others) resulted in increased activations in AI compared to
non-harmful mistakes, highlighting the role of AI in guiding
behavior through affective signals.
The aim of the current study is to investigate the neural
mechanisms of social performance monitoring in healthy
females scoring either low or high on psychopathic traits. So
far, only EEG studies have investigated performance moni-
toring in individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits.
However, these studies only investigated non-social con-
texts and mainly included incarcerated violent offenders
with psychopathy. Results demonstrated a pattern of unaf-
fected ERN amplitudes combined with reduced Pe ampli-
tudes in bothmales (Brazil et al., 2009; Munro et al., 2007) and
females (Maurer et al., 2016). Both behavioral and EEG studies
have repeatedly demonstrated learning deficits in offenders
with psychopathy, specifically for reinforcement learning
(Von Borries et al., 2010) and reversal learning (Blair, 2017;
Mitchell et al., 2006). To our knowledge, only one EEG study
did investigate the role of social context and psychopathy
when monitoring performance in a passive observation
paradigm (Brazil et al., 2011). Brazil et al. (2011) showed
overall reduced electrophysiological responses for both
observed correct and incorrect actions in psychopathic in-
dividuals, suggestive of diminished overall performance
monitoring specifically in social contexts. Nonetheless, the
role of individual differences in psychopathic traits in the
neural processing of errors and rewards in both non-social
and more interactive social contexts have not been investi-
gated in a healthy sample. This is surprising given the social
nature of human behavior in general and of psychopathy in
particular. Similar to social context, psychopathic traits in
females have received much less attention than males in
research so far. Investigating females is especially relevant
for social performance monitoring research, as females
generally show higher levels of empathic abilities e i.e.,
consideration for the feelings of others e compared to males,
making them more sensitive for social evaluations but also
better equipped while socially interacting with others (e.g.,
Christov-Moore et al., 2014). Interestingly, especially when
empathy is low in females scoring high on psychopathic
traits, this affective personality trait has been found to be a
good predictor of future violent behavior (Thomson,
Bozgunov, Psederska, & Vassileva, 2019). This effect was
absent in males scoring high on psychopathic traits. In
males, behavioral psychopathic traits like impulsivity and
risk-taking behaviors have been found to be the best pre-
dictors of future violence and aggression. Even though this
study specifically focused on aggressive behavior, it does
indicate that gender plays a role regarding which personality
trait “activates” specific behavior in individuals scoring high
on psychopathic traits (Thomson et al., 2019).
Additionally, a review study by Whittle, Yücel, Yap, and
Allen (2011) demonstrated that males and females activate
different neural regions when it comes to the processing of
emotions. The current study involves an important social
component, because subjects are responsible for the other
person’s monetary outcome in a cooperative and competitive
context, and because observing others’ performance lead toown gains and/or losses. Since these social processes could
involve emotion processing and feelings of empathy, which
has been found to be especially of influence in females
(Thomson et al., 2019), we decided to only include females. In
addition, several prior studies demonstrated significantly
higher psychopathic trait scores in males versus females in
community samples (Berkhout, Young, & Gross, 2011; Cale &
Lilienfeld, 2002; Hemph€al€a & Tengstr€om, 2010). We decided
to specifically focus on the underrepresented female sample
in order to rule out the possibility of only including high
scoringmale participants. This is of specific importance as we
pre-selected individuals from a large existing database rep-
resenting the 25% scoring highest and the 25% scoring lowest
on self-reported psychopathic traits (in line with Shao & Lee,
2017). Based on the marked self-centeredness and reduced
concern for others in individuals who score high on psycho-
pathic traits, we expected to find decreased error-related ac-
tivations in pMFC and AI compared to individuals scoring low
on psychopathic traits; specifically for mistakes that nega-
tively affect both oneself and another person. Moreover, we
expected to find enhanced reward-related activations in
striatum for selfish compared to shared gains, while the
reverse was expected for low scoring participants.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
We report how we determined our sample size, all data ex-
clusions (if any), all inclusion/exclusion criteria, whether in-
clusion/exclusion criteria were established prior to data
analysis, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. In
this study, a total of 49 healthy right handed females aged
between 18 and 31 participated. We pre-selected females
representing the lower and upper quartiles of a female dis-
tribution on the validated Dutch translation of the short-form
of the psychopathic personality inventory-short form (PPI-SF:
Tonnaer, Cima, Sijtsma, Uzieblo, & Lilienfeld, 2013; see
Questionnaires). See Table 1 for an overview of the group
characteristics, and for group differences based on indepen-
dent sample t-tests. This selectionwas done based on the self-
reports of 1057 female Psychology and Educational Science
students who completed an online survey study advertised on
the Leiden University Research Participation System (SONA).
Exclusion criteria were: current or previous medical or psy-
chiatric disorders, and use of medication that could influence
cognitive functioning. As a result of technical problems with
the scanner, we excluded 3 participants. Additionally, due to
excessive movement on 1 or more runs, we excluded 7 par-
ticipants. A total of 38 participants (19 females scoring low)
were included in the final analyses (N ¼ 38, Mean Age ¼ 19.45,
SD ¼ 2.01). Participants completed the experiment for course
credits or monetary compensation and provided written
informed consent. In case participants completed the exper-
iment for course credits, they received their earned bonus in
cash. The bonus they received was not actually based on their
performance on the task but randomly selected between 0 and
V15 euros. The Institutional Review Board of the Leiden Uni-
versity Medical Center approved all procedures. The current
Table 1 e Group characteristics of females scoring low or









Age 19.42 (1.43) 19.47 (2.50) .937
PPI-SF total 170.27 (5.25) 231.37 (7.94) <.001
F1 (Fearless
Dominance) total
71.73 (12.32) 93.62 (16.25) ¼ .004
F2 (Self-centered
Impulsivity) total
81.45 (9.47) 119.37 (8.77) <.001
Machiavellian
Egocentricity
26.18 (5.25) 38.87 (4.85) <.001
Social Potency 35.45 (7.41) 45.12 (9.54) ¼ .023
Fearlessness 22.55 (6.93) 32.00 (4.72) ¼ .004
Coldheartedness 17.09 (3.45) 18.37 (3.42) .432
Impulsive
Nonconformity
17.91 (2.91) 27.62 (4.53) <.001
Externalization of
Guilt
14.91 (3.48) 23.62 (5.90) ¼ .001
Carefree
Nonplanfulness
22.45 (4.76) 29.25 (6.02) ¼ .014
Stress Immunity 13.73 (2.94) 16.50 (5.32) .211
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Helsinki.
2.2. Experimental task and procedure
Participants performed the validated Cannonball task, which
has been used before in studies investigating social perfor-
mance monitoring processes (De Bruijn et al., 2009; Radke, de
Lange, Ullsperger, & de Bruijn, 2011). The aim was to stop a
horizontally moving cannon (two-dimensional triangle-
shaped figure) by precisely lining it up with the stationary 2-
dimensional square target by a button press (see Fig. 1).
Hitting the target resulted in a monetary gain (V0.10), and
missing the target resulted in a monetary loss (V0.10).
Three same-sex participants were invited to the scanner to
participate in a joint shooting game of which one participant
would go into the scanner, while the other two players would
play from separate rooms. They were explained that they
would play the game e consisting of the following 3 blocks: an
individual block, a cooperative block, and a competitive block
e online. During the introduction phase, the three partici-
pants had to practice the task together in the same room. Prior
to the scanning session, two out of three participants were
directed to separate rooms where they were explained that
they would not actually perform the Cannonball task but
another unrelated behavioral task. After they finished the
task, they received course credits or monetary compensation
for their participation.
Thus, the participant in the scanner did not actually play
with and against the two unknown peers. In reality, the
computer mimicked actual performance of the participant
with a delay to balance own performance and performance of
the co-actors throughout the experiment. The blocks were
counterbalanced between participants, and the experimenter
verbally explained whom they would cooperate with andwhom theywould compete against before the task started and
in between blocks.
In linewith previous studies using this paradigm (De Bruijn
et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2011), the size of the target was
dynamically adapted based on the participants’ performance
such that a mean hit rate of around 63% was achieved. This
was done in order to reach the same level of errors and correct
trials in each individual, which enabled us to make contrasts
based on a comparable number of trials across groups and
contexts. Note that the use of an adaptive criterion thus
ensured that performance is controlled for in the Cannonball
task, such that behavioral effects are not expected nor of in-
terest in this study. The change in target size was determined
after each trial by comparing the current actual percentage of
correct trials and the goal percentage of correct trials using the
following formula: Change¼(Actual_Percentage_CorrectGoal
_Percentage_Correct)*Change_Factor)/100*Current_Target
Size). The Change_Factor was set at .25 based on previous
studies using the same paradigm (see De Bruijn et al., 2009;
Radke et al., 2011). When the current percentage was higher
than the goal percentage, the change was subtracted from the
current target size. When the current percentage was lower
than the goal percentage, the change was added. This dy-
namic procedure was newly applied at the start of each
context and thus ensured that the 63% percent hit rate was
achieved independently for each context.
The task was played in three different contexts: individual
(non-social), cooperation (social; co-actor 1), and competition
(social; co-actor 2). In the individual context, the participant
played 80 trials alone (8 blocks of 10 trials). Hitting or missing
the target only affected their own monetary outcome (see
Fig. 2). In the cooperative and competitive context, partici-
pants alternated between performing and observing in 16
blocks of 10 trials each (8 blocks playing, 8 blocks observing).
In both cases, the performance of the person playing had a
direct effect on the financial outcome of the co-actor. For the
cooperative context, stopping the cannon under the target
resulted in a shared monetary gain (plus V0.10 each), and
missing the target resulted in a shared monetary loss (minus
V0.10 each). For the competitive context, hitting the target
resulted in amonetary gain for the player (plusV0.10), but in a
monetary loss for the co-actor (minus V0.10). Missing the
target on the other hand resulted in a monetary loss for the
player (minus V0.10), but in a monetary gain for the co-actor
(plus V0.10).
Prior to the presentation of each stimulus, a jittered fixa-
tion cross appeared between 750 and 1250 msec. Target loca-
tion was randomly determined on each trial, whereas the
cannon was always horizontally centered. Immediately after
presentation, the cannon started moving either to the right or
the left for a maximum of 2.5 lengths (3500 msec) in total. An
unambiguous feedback signal (thumbs up/thumbs down) was
presented 750msec after the button press, indicating whether
the response resulted in a hit or a miss. Each block started
with a cue instructing participants about whether they were
playing in the individual, cooperative, or competitive context.
Additionally, the words “you play” or “you observe” were
presented in the center of the screen to indicate what was
expected of participants.
Fig. 1 e Example of a Correct and an Incorrect trial. The aim of the task is to stop a horizontally moving cannon (triangle) by a
button press, precisely lining it up with a stationary target to shoot the target (square). A mini-block design was used in
which participants alternate between performing and observing in blocks of 10 trials each. The size of the target was
dynamically adapted based on the participants’ performance such that a mean hit rate of 63% would be achieved.
Participants win 10 cents for hitting the target and lose 10 cents for missing the target.
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To assess psychopathic traits, participants completed the
Dutch translation of the PPI-SF (Tonnaer et al., 2013). The 100-
item PPI-SF is answered on a 4-point Likert scale (1-false and 4-
true) and contains 8 subscales: 1. Machiavellian Egocentricity
(ruthlessness and narcissism in interpersonal functioning), 2.
Social Potency (perceived ability to influence and manipulateFig. 2 e Reward outcomes when playing alone (non-social cont
competitive situation (social context). In the social contexts, the
observe.others), 3. Coldheartedness (callousness, guiltlessness, and
unsentimentality), 4. Carefree Nonplanfulness (attitude of
indifference in planning one’s actions), 5. Fearlessness
(absence of anticipatory anxiety concerning harm and risk
taking behavior), 6. Blame Externalization (externalizing and
rationalizing misbehavior), 7. Impulsive Nonconformity
(reckless lack of concern regarding social mores), and 8. Stress
Immunity (absence of emotional reactions to anxiety-ext) or when playing with a co-actor in a cooperative or
participant and the co-actor interchangeably play and
c o r t e x 1 2 9 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 1 9 9e2 1 0204provoking events). The PPI-SF can be subdivided in two
higher-order factors: F1) Fearless Dominance, consisting of
the subscales Social Potency, Fearlessness, and Stress Im-
munity, and F2) Self-centered Impulsivity, consisting
of the subscales Machiavellian Egocentricity, Carefree Non-
planfulness, Blame Externalization, and Impulsive
Nonconformity.
2.4. fMRI data analysis
MRI scans were obtained with a Philips 3.0 T MRI scanner at
the Leiden University Medical Center. Foam inserts that sur-
rounded the head restricted headmotion. Functional scans for
the task were acquired during three runs with T2-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI). The first two volumes of each run
were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation ef-
fects. After the functional scanning the following settings
were used: TR ¼ 2.2 sec, TE ¼ 30 msec, sequential acquisition,
38 slices, slice thickness ¼ 2.75 mm, Field of View
(FOV) ¼ 220  220  114.68 mm.
The experimental task was projected on a screen, which
was visible to participants through a mirror. Data were
analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London). The following pre-processing steps were
used: correction for slice timing acquisition and rigid body
motion, spatial normalization to T1 templates (MNI305 ste-
reotaxic space) using a 12-parameter affine transform
together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine
basis functions and resampling of the volumes to 3 mm vox-
els. Functional scans were smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM
isotropic Gaussian kernel. The 38 participants who were
included in the final analyses had a mean maximum head
movement of .93 and an absolute maximum head movement
of 3.16 mm.
All events were time locked to the onset of the outcome
screen. The trial functionswere used as covariates in a general
linear model; along with a basic set of cosine functions that
high-pass filtered the data. The least-squares parameter es-
timates of height of the best fitting canonical HRF for each
context were used in pair-wise contrasts. The resulting
contrast images, computed on a subject-by-subject basis,
were submitted to group analyses. We tested the neural
response to feedback (thumbs up: hit, thumbs down: miss)
with two full factorial designs in line with prior studies using
the Cannonball task (De Bruijn et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2011).
To identify the areas typically involved in performance
monitoring and reward processing, based on prior studies by
De Bruijn et al. (2009) and Radke et al. (2011), full factorial
designs were computed. First, we tested for the main effect of
Error > Correct by performing a 2 (Context: Individual,
Cooperation)  2 (Correctness: Correct, Error)  2 (Group: PPI
low, PPI high) full factorial design. Second, the main effect of
Gain > Loss was computed using a 2 (Context: Cooperation,
Competition)  2 (Agency: Play, Observe)  2 (Outcome: Gain,
Loss)  2 (Group: PPI low, PPI high) full factorial design. Main
effects were considered significant if they exceeded a family-
wise error (FWE) voxel level threshold of p < .05.Next, we performed anatomical region of interest (ROI)
analyses using the Marsbar toolbox in SPM8 (Brett, Anton,
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) for the AI and striatum in order
to further investigate patterns of activation for error and
reward mechanisms. These anatomical regions have been
selected based on previous studies (De Bruijn et al., 2009;
Radke et al., 2011) and were derived from the MarsBaR
anatomical toolbox. Additionally, since there is no anatomical
pMFC available in the MarsBaR anatomical toolbox, we per-
formed ROI analyses on a 10 mm radius sphere of the pMFC
centered on 4, 32, 38 (De Bruijn et al., 2009). Beta values
reflecting activity were averaged across all voxels in the
cluster, resulting in a mean value per ROI for each condition
for each participant.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data
As expected from the use of the adaptive criterion, a 3 (Context:
Individual, Cooperative, Competitive)  2 (Group: low PPI, high
PPI) repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant differ-
ences in average hit rate, neither for condition [F(2,72) ¼ 2.88,
p ¼ .06], nor for group [F(1,36) ¼ 2.29, p ¼ .14]. A 2 (Context:
Cooperation, Competition)  2 (Agency: Play, Observe)  2
(Group, low PPI, high PPI) repeated-measures ANOVA, showed
equal average hit rates in both the cooperative and competitive
context [F(1,36)¼ .16, p¼ .69], bothwhen playing and observing
[F(1, 36) ¼ .13, p ¼ .72], and both in the low and high PPI group
[F(1,36) ¼ 1.22, p ¼ .28]. For the means, see Table 2.
Next, we ran the samemodels with the dependent variable
Target Size and the additional factor Correctness. These an-
alyses only showed the expected main effects of Correctness
(both p’s < .001) with larger target sizes for correct (mean)
compared to incorrect responses (mean), but none of themain
effects of Group, nor interactions with Group reached signifi-
cance (all F’s < 2.68; all p’s > .11).
3.2. fMRI analyses
3.2.1. Whole brain contrast: monitoring own actions when
making mistakes that only negatively affect oneself (individual,
non-social context) versus mistakes that additionally negatively
affect others (cooperative context)
3.2.1.1. MAIN EFFECT ERROR > CORRECT (INDIVIDUAL & COOPERATION).
The whole brain contrast for Error > Correct revealed more
activation in pMFC (6, 20, 43; FWE corrected, p < .05), and
bilateral AI left AI: 39, 17, 2, right AI: 36, 20, 7; FWE cor-
rected, p < .05) in line with the study of the De Bruijn et al.
(2009), and Radke et al. (2011) (see Fig. 3A).
3.2.1.2. ROI ANALYSES (PLAY)
3.2.1.2.1. PLAYING UNSUCCESSFULLY LEADING TO SHARED (COOPER-
ATION) OR OWN (INDIVIDUAL) LOSS. For the pMFC (see Fig. 3), we
found no significant main effect for Context or Group, nor did
we find a significant interaction for Correctness*Group,













Low PPI group 63.3 (1.9)% 64.2 (2.7)% 64.4 (2.0)% 64.7 (5.4)% 63.6 (3.6)%
High PPI group 62.6 (2.1)% 63.1 (2.6)% 63.8 (2.7)% 62.6 (7.1)% 63.7 (4.4)%
Target size
Low PPI group 24.10 (4.76) 24.27 (6.03) 22.72 (4.33) 24.27 (6.03) 25.70 (5.25)
High PPI group 26.11 (5.61) 25.70 (5.25) 25.77 (6.00) 22.72 (4.33) 25.77 (6.00)
Fig. 3 e A) Whole brain contrast (full factorial design) for the main effect of Error > Correct for N ¼ 38 (FWE corrected, p < .05)
revealed posterior medial frontal cortex activation. B) Interaction effect for Context*Group based on the parameter estimates
of the pMFC. The low PPI group showed no difference in activation between Individual and Cooperation, whereas the high
PPI group showed significantly higher activation for the Individual versus the Cooperation Context. Results showed no
significant between group effects.
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p’s > .43). However, we did find a significant interaction effect
for Context*Group [F(1,36) ¼ 6.52, p¼ .02, h2 ¼ .15] (see Fig. 3B).
Follow-up tests within group for the pMFC demonstrated that
the high scoring group showed significant higher activation
for the Individual versus the Cooperative Context (p¼ .02). The
low scoring group showed no significant difference between
the two contexts (p ¼ .15). Between group follow-up tests
showed no significant effects (all p’s > .15).
For the left AI, results showed no significantmain effect for
Context or Group, nor any significant interactions (all
p’s > .14). For the right AI, results also showed no significant
main effect for Context or Group, nor any significant interac-
tion effects (all p’s ¼ .08).
3.2.2. Whole brain contrast: own rewards in a social context
with either positive (shared gain) or negative consequences
(selfish gain) for the co-player
3.2.2.1. MAIN EFFECT: GAIN > LOSS (COOPERATION & COMPETITION).
The whole brain contrast for Gain > Loss revealed more acti-
vation in bilateral striatum (left striatum: 15, 14, 8; right
striatum: 15, 14, 11; FWE corrected, p < .05) in line with the
study of De Bruijn et al. (2009) (see Fig. 4A).3.2.2.2. ROI ANALYSES (COOPERATION AND COMPETITION)
3.2.2.2.1. PLAYING SUCCESSFULLY LEADING TO SHARED (COOPERA-
TION) OR SELFISH GAIN (COMPETITION) FOR ONESELF. None of the main
effects or interactions for both the left and right striatumwere
significant (all p’s > .14).
3.2.2.2.2. OBSERVING OTHER’S PERFORMANCE LEADING TO SHARED
(COOPERATION) OR SELFISH GAIN (COMPETITION) FOR ONESELF. For the left
striatum, results showed no significant main effect for
Context or Group, nor significant interactions for Con-
text*Group, Correctness*Group, or Context*Correctness (all
p’s > .11). Results did show a significant interaction effect for
Context*Outcome*Group [F(1,36) ¼ 4.66, p ¼ .04, h2 ¼ .12] (see
Fig. 4B). Follow-up tests within group demonstrated that the
low PPI group showed enhanced activation for shared gains
compared to shared loss during observation (p ¼ .03), while
the high PPI group showed enhanced activation for selfish
gains compared to selfish loss while observing the co-actor
(p ¼ .01). Additionally, results showed a trend significant
within group effect for the low PPI group, showing less deac-
tivation when losing money in a competitive context versus a
cooperative context (p ¼ .08). Next, follow-up tests between
group showed a significant difference for losses in the coop-
erative context. The high scoring group showed significant
Fig. 4 e A) Whole brain contrast (full factorial design) for the main effect of Gain > Loss for N ¼ 38 (FWE corrected, p < .05). B)
Significant interaction effect for Context*Outcome*Group for Observe in the left striatum.Within groups, results showed the
following: the low PPI group showed enhanced activation for shared gains compared to shared loss during observation,
while the high PPI group showed enhanced activation for selfish gains compared to selfish loss while observing the co-
actor. This effect was only significant for Observe, not for Play.
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(p ¼ .03).
For the right striatum, results showed no significant main
effect for Context, nor any significant interaction for Con-
text*Group, Correctness*Group, or Context*Correctness
(all p’s > .10). We only found a trend significant main effect
for group [F(1,36) ¼ 4.09, p ¼ .05, h2 ¼ .10], and a trend signifi-
cant interaction effect for Context*Correctness*Group
[F(1,36) ¼ 3.54, p ¼ .07, h2 ¼ .09].4. Discussion
Our aim was to improve our understanding of the role of
individual differences in psychopathic traits in social perfor-
mance monitoring. First, the results showed the expected
involvement of pMFC for incorrect versus correct actions, as
well as striatum for shared and selfish rewards. Second, fe-
males scoring high on psychopathic traits showed decreased
activation in pMFC when monitoring own actions while per-
forming in a cooperative context in which actions additionally
affected their co-player versus performing in an individual
context in which actions only affected themselves. Third, the
low PPI group showed increased striatal activity specifically
when observing co-actors’ performance leading to shared
gains, whereas the high PPI group only showed this pattern for
observing performance resulting in selfish gains.
Involvement of pMFC and AI in performance monitoring
has been demonstrated repeatedly in non-social contexts (see
e.g., Botvinick et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) with
stronger activations reflecting enhanced monitoring. More
recently, these areas have also been highlighted in fMRI
studies on performancemonitoring in a social context (Cracco
et al., 2016; De Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban et al., 2013) as well as
in EEG studies that mainly focused on social modulations ofthe ERN (see e.g., Brazil et al., 2011; De Bruijn, Ruissen, &
Radke, 2017; De Bruijn & von Rhein, 2012; Koban, Pourtois,
Bediou, & Vuilleumier, 2012; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, &
Vuilleumier, 2010). This work has amongst others shown
that e in healthy adults e performance monitoring is
enhanced when participants’ actions have consequences for
others. Performance monitoring was, for example, increased
in cooperative situations, thought to reflect increased moti-
vation to perform well in order to prevent feelings of guilt or
shame when playing for a team (Koban et al., 2012). The re-
sults from this EEG study additionally showed that this
motivation was specifically elevated for individuals reporting
high levels of perspective taking, highlighting individual dif-
ferences. Moreover, a recent study from our lab showed that
performing in a social context with potentially harmful (loud
aversive sound) versus non-harmful (soft non-aversive sound)
consequences for another person led to amplified early per-
formance monitoring processes (enhanced ERN amplitudes),
increased levels of arousal, and enhanced effort to perform
well (De Bruijn et al., 2019). Finally, another study from our lab
revealed larger ERN amplitudes after oxytocin administration,
but only for mistakes that additionally negatively affected a
co-actor’s chance of winning extra money (De Bruijn et al.,
2017). This finding suggests that oxytocin levels may specif-
ically modulate error significance in a social context,
emphasizing again the role of individual differences in this
process.
Although the overall analyses showed the expected
pattern of concurrent activation of pMFC and AI for erroneous
compared to correct actions, group effects were restricted to
the pMFC. For the pMFC, the high PPI group showed decreased
activation for cooperative versus individual contexts inde-
pendent of correctness. This effect was absent for the low PPI
group. pMFC is thought to play a central role in performance
monitoring and action control, activated amongst others by
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facilitate behavioral adjustment (Ullsperger et al., 2014). The
AI, however, has been shown to be specifically involved in
interoception and error awareness (see e.g., Hester, Foxe,
Molholm, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2005; Klein, Ullsperger, &
Danielmeier, 2013) emphasizing its affective role in perfor-
mance monitoring and guiding behavioral adjustments (see
also Koban et al., 2013). The high scorers in the present study
displayed enhanced performance monitoring in pMFC when
consequences of their actions only affected themselves, sug-
gesting that they experienced enhanced error significance in
this context facilitating performance monitoring and leading
to a stronger tendency to, for example, prevent errors or
adjust their behavior adequately. This effect was absent for
the low PPI group. The outcome of reduced pMFC activation
for the cooperative context in the high PPI group may be
explained by a study performed by Klucharev, Munneke,
Smidts, and Fernandez (2011), who showed that suppressing
the pMFC by transcranial magnetic stimulation led to lower
levels of adaptive behavior after experiencing a social conflict.
Possibly, psychopathic traits are related to a default down-
regulation of this areawhenmonitoring performance in social
situations. This interpretation fits with the EEG findings from
Brazil et al. (2011) who showed reduced performance moni-
toring in incarcerated individuals with psychopathy, but only
when observing others’ actions and not when performing
themselves. This possible default downregulation of the pMFC
when performing in a cooperative context may be due to the
fact that individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits do
not experience errors made in a social context e including the
additional social threat of being evaluated e as more aversive
compared to an individual context (Rilling et al., 2007). This
might suggest distorted emotional saliency (Seara-Cardoso,
Sebastian, Viding, & Roiser, 2015), which may result in dif-
ferences in general motivation and/or cognitive efforts to
monitor performance in a social context.
Contrary to our expectations, performance monitoring was
not enhanced in a social context in AI. We had expected AI
involvement, because previous studies had demonstrated AI
activations related to increased error significance and/or
associated distress of the possibility of making mistakes that
negatively affect others (Koban et al., 2013; Seara-Cardoso,
Sebastian, et al., 2015). Koban et al. (2013) for example
showed that AI was specifically involved when making
harmful mistakes and proposed that AI generates an affective
signal that may guide subsequent adjustment. Additionally,
Cracco et al. (2016) conducted a study in which AI was acti-
vatedwhen observing a co-actor make amistake for which the
participant was partly responsible. Moreover, they found that
AI activation was directly related to self-reported feelings of
guilt and responsibility. Next, although we found an overall
effect of increased AI activation for erroneous versus correct
trials, we did not find any significant group differences in this
brain area. We expected group differences in AI activations
based on a study that focused on the role of individual differ-
ences in psychopathic traits when being responsible for other
people’s pain by delivering electroshocks (Molenberghs et al.,
2014). Results revealed an association between psychopathy
scores and (left) AI when punishing another person for giving
an incorrect answer. These results were explained by a lack ofempathy and fit with previous neuroimaging studies that
showed deficits in high scorers in empathic responding toward
others in distress (Blair, Mitchell,& Blair, 2005; Decety, Skelly,&
Kiehl, 2013; Seara-Cardoso, Viding, Lickley, & Sebastian, 2015).
Although the current data suggest that individuals scoring
high on psychopathic traits do not seem to have specific defi-
cits in generating such affective signals in situations where
one’s actions affect others, we did see a trend showing higher
AI activity for low scorers during errors. One explanation may
be that our currently used monetary consequences e
compared to pain stimuli often used in previous studies
(Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014) e were simply not strong
enough to evoke clear affective effects of these individual dif-
ferences. Future studies should further investigate the role of
AI in relation to psychopathic traits when levels of re-
sponsibility and action consequences differ. Taken together,
the current results showed decreased activation in pMFC in
cooperative versus individual contexts for the high PPI group,
which is in line with their reduced concern for how their ac-
tions may affect others and their overall goal-directed
egocentric behavioral style aimed at personal gain (see S1).
Next, our findings demonstrated differences in striatal
activity for observing performance resulting in shared or
selfish monetary gain. Although striatal activity may repre-
sent other processes such as motivation or decision-making,
the results do fit with the well-established role of striatum
in reward processing (see e.g., Delgado, 2007). The current
pattern of outcomes thus suggests that low scoring in-
dividuals experience shared gains as more rewarding than
selfish gains, while the high scorers show the reversed
pattern. The enhanced striatal activity in the high scoring
group when observing their co-actor fail e resulting in per-
sonal gain e may in part be explained by the concept of
“schadenfreude”, a pleasure derived from the misfortune of
others (Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Porter et al., 2014).
Takahashi et al. (2009) showed a positive relationship between
self-reported schadenfreude and striatal activity when an
unfortunate event happened to an envied person. Although
fMRI studies in this population are lacking, behavioral studies
have demonstrated a positive relationship between psycho-
pathic personality traits and self-reported schadenfreude
(James et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2018; Porter et al., 2014). The
competitive context may even have strengthened the scha-
denfreude experience for the high scorers (Abell & Brewer,
2017, while in the low scorers this context may have
enhanced feelings of empathy towards the co-actor (see S1,
Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). Paulus et al. (2018) describe
feelings of empathy when noticing or hearing about another
person’s misfortune as “fremdscham”, which can be
explained as an affective state derived from the emotional
state of the person you empathize with (Bird & Viding, 2014).
However,more research is needed to understandwhat exactly
is driving the currently found group differences.
One limitation of the current study is that we used a rather
arbitrary cut-off point to classify participants into the low or
high scoring group. However, it should be noted that the PPI-
SF does not define cutoffs to delineate a clinical and/or sub-
clinical range. Therefore, we pre-selected individuals from a
large existing database representing the top 25% and bottom
25% of self-reported psychopathic traits creating two groups
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limitation is the relatively small sample size. To overcome
these issues, future studies may additionally aim at employ-
ing a dimensional approach using a larger sample enabling a
focus on the full range of psychopathic trait levels. Moreover,
since we believe that feelings of responsibility play a role in
the extent to which making a mistake in a social context af-
fects performance-monitoring behavior, it would be inter-
esting to assess self-reported levels of responsibility,
schadenfreude, and fremdscham regarding making mistakes
in a social context. Finally, we like to point out that the brain
areas we currently found to be activated have also been
implicated in signaling prediction errors, i.e., the discrepancy
between expected and actual outcomes (Brown& Braver, 2005;
Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, & Berns,
2002). These expectancies can be objective or subjective and
the social context may have an impact on the latter. A recent
study from our lab, for example, demonstrated that making
mistakes in a context where participants were more moti-
vated to perform well resulted in larger error-related nega-
tivities (ERN), an ERP component thought to reflect prediction
errors. This increase was present in the absence of actual
performance differences that could drive objective expec-
tancy violations (see De Bruijn et al., 2019). In the current
study, however, it is not so straightforward to explain the
current results in terms of prediction errors. First of all,
objective expectancy violations cannot, for example, explain
the pattern of striatal activation currently found. As perfor-
mance was kept under control, all conditions resulted in the
occurrence of positive feedback signals in 63% and negative
feedback signals in 37% of all trials. Negative feedback signals
(or incorrect responses) were thus less frequent and should be
more unexpected. However, striatummainly responded to the
personal monetary consequence of the feedback (gain or loss)
with decreased activations for losses also present in the
competitive context. One could argue though that the acti-
vation patterns in the competitive context might reflect sub-
jective expectancy violations to a certain extent. For example,
high scoring individuals might expect to beat their opponents
and thus observe them fail. Observing their opponent perform
correctly would then thus be associated with a bigger loss
than expected. However, because we did not measure the
(subjective) expectancies in our task we cannot draw any
conclusions regarding the role of prediction errors in the
current outcomes. Future studies should therefore focus on
including additional subjective measures on expectancies in
order to get a better insight in what is driving differences in
brain activity.
The current study also opens up new research avenues. For
example, because of the close link between reward sensitivity
and learning (Berridge, 2000), it would be interesting to
investigate whether healthy individuals scoring high on psy-
chopathic traits also rely on distinct neural mechanisms
during reward-dependent learning in a social context. Would
performance for example be different when learning in a
cooperative versus competitive context? Previously reported
observations for example showed that non-criminal in-
dividuals scoring high on psychopathic traits seem to thrive
especially well in highly competitive work settings (Babiak &
Hare, 2006; Ten Brinke, Black, Porter, & Carney, 2015). Thus,our findings not only reveal the neural mechanisms underly-
ing individual differences in the level of concern for others
(see S2) during social performance monitoring, but they may
also have important implications for educational and perhaps
even clinical and treatment settings. Although we are not able
to translate these findings to incarcerated populations, it
would be interesting to investigate the role of social context in
learning from mistakes, as this may form a starting point for
developing interventions aimed at normalizing reduced
concern for others.5. Conclusions
Using a validated social performance monitoring paradigm,
the current study provides evidence for distinct activation
patterns in pMFC in healthy non-incarcerated females
scoring low or high on psychopathic traits when monitoring
performance in situations in which the level of responsibility
for others varies. Moreover, when another person is respon-
sible for your benefits, sharing gains is associated with less or
more reward-related activation in striatum compared to
selfish gains depending on the level of psychopathic traits.
The present findings thus demonstrate for the first time that
performance monitoring and reward-related processes in
different social contexts are dependent on psychopathic
traits in healthy females. We propose that these altered
processes may play a role in the known shift from other-
directed to self-centered behavior in individuals with psy-
chopathy and may hence partly explain the deficits these
individuals have in understanding others (cf. Bird & Viding,
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